Socrates on Virtue and its Sufficiency for Happiness
Plato, Euthydemus, 278e - 282d, trans. Benjamin Jowett, modified.
In an email message to the International Stoic Forum, Keith Seddon reconstructed Socrates' argument for the sufficiency of virtue for happiness: Socrates on Virtue and its Sufficiency for Happiness. This argument also appeared as a paper in Dr. Seddon's Stoic Foundation Correspondence Course: Good, Bad, and Indifferent. It also appears in Dr. Seddon's (pp. 23-27) Stoic Serenity: A Practical Course on Finding Inner Peace.
And now, O son of Axiochus, let me put a question
to you: Do not all men desire happiness? And yet, perhaps, this is one
of those ridiculous questions which I am afraid to ask, and which ought
not to be asked by a sensible man: for what human being is there who
does not desire happiness?
There is no one, said Clinias, who does not.
Well, then, I said, since we all of us desire happiness, how can we be
happy?--that is the next question. Shall we not be happy if we have many
good things? And this, perhaps, is even a more simple question than the
first, for there can be no doubt of the answer.
And what things do we esteem good? No solemn sage is required to tell us
this, which may be easily answered; for every one will say that wealth
is a good.
Certainly, he said.
And are not health and beauty goods, and other personal gifts?
Can there be any doubt that good birth, and power, and honours in one's
own land, are goods?
And what other goods are there? I said. What do you say of temperance,
justice, courage: do you not verily and indeed think, Clinias, that we
shall be more right in ranking them as goods than in not ranking them as
goods? For a dispute might possibly arise about this. What then do you
They are goods, said Clinias.
Very well, I said; and where in the company shall we find a place for
wisdom--among the goods or not?
Among the goods.
And now, I said, think whether we have left out any considerable goods.
I do not think that we have, said Clinias.
Upon recollection, I said, indeed I am afraid that we have left out the
greatest of them all.
What is that? he asked.
Fortune, Clinias, I replied; which all, even the most foolish, admit to
be the greatest of goods.
True, he said.
On second thoughts, I added, how narrowly, O son of Axiochus, have you
and I escaped making a laughing-stock of ourselves to the strangers.
Why do you say so?
Why, because we have already spoken of good-fortune, and are but
What do you mean?
I mean that there is something ridiculous in again putting forward
good-fortune, which has a place in the list already, and saying the same
thing twice over.
He asked what was the meaning of this, and I replied: Surely wisdom is
good-fortune; even a child may know that.
The simple-minded youth was amazed; and, observing his surprise, I said
to him: Do you not know, Clinias, that flute-players are most fortunate
and successful in performing on the flute?
And are not the scribes most fortunate in writing and reading letters?
Amid the dangers of the sea, again, are any more fortunate on the whole
than wise pilots?
And if you were engaged in war, in whose company would you rather take
the risk--in company with a wise general, or with a foolish one?
With a wise one.
And if you were ill, whom would you rather have as a companion in a
dangerous illness--a wise physician, or an ignorant one?
A wise one.
You think, I said, that to act with a wise man is more fortunate than to
act with an ignorant one?
Then wisdom always makes men fortunate: for by wisdom no man would ever
err, and therefore he must act rightly and succeed, or his wisdom would
be wisdom no longer.
We contrived at last, somehow or other, to agree in a general
conclusion, that he who had wisdom had no need of fortune. I then
recalled to his mind the previous state of the question. You remember, I
said, our making the admission that we should be happy and fortunate if
many good things were present with us?
And should we be happy by reason of the presence of good things, if they
benefited us not, or if they benefited us?
If they benefited us, he said.
And would they benefit us, if we only had them and did not use them? For
example, if we had a great deal of food and did not eat, or a great deal
of drink and did not drink, should we be benefited?
Certainly not, he said.
Or would an artisan, who had all the implements necessary for his work,
and did not use them, be any the better for the possession of them? For
example, would a carpenter be any the better for having all his tools
and plenty of wood, if he never worked?
Certainly not, he said.
And if a person had wealth and all the goods of which we were just now
speaking, and did not use them, would he be happy because he possessed
No indeed, Socrates.
Then, I said, a man who would be happy must not only have the good
things, but he must also use them; there is no benefit in merely
Well, Clinias, but if you have the use as well as the possession of
good things, is that sufficient to confer happiness?
Yes, in my opinion.
And may a person use them either rightly or wrongly?
He must use them rightly.
That is quite true, I said. And the wrong use of a thing is far worse
than the non-use; for the one is an evil, and the other is neither a
good nor an evil. You admit that?
Now in the working and use of wood, is not that which gives the right
use simply the knowledge of the carpenter?
Nothing else, he said.
And surely, in the manufacture of vessels, knowledge is that which gives
the right way of making them?
And in the use of the goods of which we spoke at first--wealth and
health and beauty, is not knowledge that which directs us to the right
use of them, and regulates our practice about them?
Then in every possession and every use of a thing, knowledge is that
which gives a man not only good-fortune but success?
He again assented.
And tell me, I said, O tell me, what do possessions benefit a man, if he
have neither good sense nor wisdom? Would a man be better off, having
and doing many things without wisdom, or a few things with wisdom?
Look at the matter thus: If he did fewer things would he not make fewer
mistakes? if he made fewer mistakes would he not have fewer misfortunes?
and if he had fewer misfortunes would he not be less miserable?
Certainly, he said.
And who would do least--a poor man or a rich man?
A poor man.
A weak man or a strong man?
A weak man.
A noble man or a mean man?
A mean man.
And a coward would do less than a courageous and temperate man?
And an indolent man less than an active man?
And a slow man less than a quick; and one who had dull perceptions of
seeing and hearing less than one who had keen ones?
All this was mutually allowed by us.
Then, I said, Clinias, the sum of the matter appears to be that the
goods of which we spoke before are not to be regarded as goods in
themselves, but the degree of good and evil in them depends on whether
they are or are not under the guidance of knowledge: under the guidance
of ignorance, they are greater evils than their opposites, inasmuch as
they are more able to minister to the evil principle which rules them;
and when under the guidance of wisdom and prudence, they are greater
goods: but in themselves they are nothing?
That, he replied, is obvious.
What then is the result of what has been said? Is not this the
result--that other things are indifferent, and that wisdom is the only
good, and ignorance the only evil?
Let us consider a further point, I said: Seeing that all men desire
happiness, and happiness, as has been shown, is gained by a use, and
a right use, of the things of life, and the right use of them, and
good-fortune in the use of them, is given by knowledge,--the inference
is that everybody ought by all means to try and make himself as wise as
Yes, he said.
And when a man thinks that he ought to obtain this treasure, far more
than money, from a father or a guardian or a friend or a suitor, whether
citizen or stranger--the eager desire and prayer to them that they would
impart wisdom to you, is not at all dishonourable, Clinias; nor is any
one to be blamed for doing any honourable service or ministration to any
man, whether a lover or not, if his aim is to get wisdom. Do you agree?
Yes, he said, I quite agree, and think that you are right.
Yes, I said, Clinias, if only wisdom can be taught, and does not
come to man spontaneously; for this is a point which has still to be
considered, and is not yet agreed upon by you and me--
But I think, Socrates, that wisdom can be taught, he said.
Best of men, I said, I am delighted to hear you say so; and I am
also grateful to you for having saved me from a long and tiresome
investigation as to whether wisdom can be taught or not. But now, as
you think that wisdom can be taught, and that wisdom only can make a man
happy and fortunate, will you not acknowledge that all of us ought to
love wisdom, and you individually will try to love her?
Certainly, Socrates, he said; I will do my best.
Happiness is in our Power
Euthydemus, section 278e - Perseus Digital Library.
Keith Seddon (2007).Stoic Serenity: A Practical Course on Finding Inner Peace. United Kingdom: Lulu.com.